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D.H. Lawrence’s plural jurisprudence: an enquiry into Desmond
Manderson’s post-positivist ‘law and literature’
Luis Gómez Romero*
University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia
The border means more than a customs house, a passport officer, a man with a
gun. Over there everything is going to be different; life is never going to be quite
the same again after your passport has been stamped and you find yourself
speechless among the money-changers.
Graham Greene, The Lawless Roads
This article draws on Desmond Manderson’s theorisation of ‘law and literature’
in order to undertake a jurisprudential reading of the last two ‘leadership novels’
that D.H. Lawrence published in the 1920s: Kangaroo and The Plumed Serpent.
This reading demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses in Manderson’s
methodology while simultaneously contextualising the experience of modernity
through Lawrence’s Australian and Mexican narratives. In sum, the article
tests Manderson’s (Australian) jurisprudential reading of Kangaroo with the
troubled (Mexican) modernity that emerged from the Mexican Revolution, as it is
channelled through The Plumed Serpent.
Introduction: two countries, two tragedies
D.H. Lawrence visited both Australia and Mexico during his lifetime journey across
the world. Lawrence’s encounter with these countries respectively resulted in two
novels: Kangaroo (1923) and The Plumed Serpent (1926). In each of these novels
Lawrence exposes the advent of discrete crises resulting from the failure of human
ideals and institutions to prevent and tame violence. Lawrence’s hatred of the
political and cultural developments that he believed inevitably accompanied modern
society arises in both works. Yet the crises exposed in these novels are not identical:
different contexts amount to different mythologies and tragedies.
‘Modern’ began to appear as a term more or less synonymous with ‘now’ in the
sixteenth century.1 By the eighteenth century, the term ‘modernise’ shifted its meaning
and began to indicate updating and improvement.2 ‘Modernity’ is thus described
nowadays as a set of economic and social conditions–including capitalism, bureau-
cracy and technological development–that are accompanied by specific experiences of
historical consciousness: for example, scientific innovation, the development of the
nation state, urbanisation, the industrialisation of production, the expansion of
*Email: lgromero@uow.edu.au
1Williams (1988 [1976]), p 208; (2007 [1989]), p 31.
2Williams (2007 [1989]), p 32.
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capitalist market or the spread of mass entertainment.3 Lawrence’s Australian and
Mexican novels speak out distinct social, political and legal predicaments that are
actually rooted in distinct modernities. In other words, Lawrence perceived that the
‘modernising’ processes (and outcomes) whereby Australian and Mexican societies
were transformed from traditional forms of political and economic organisation to
contemporary capitalism were significantly different.
Lawrence’s discontent with modernity is as plural as modernity itself. This
insight into the possibility of multifaceted and contesting modernities constitutes
Lawrence into an authentic postmodern political philosopher and jurisprudent whose
work should be reviewed by men and women of law not for the refined amusement
of reading modernist literature, but for the study of the shortcomings and limits of
the conceptions of justice and methods of legal modernity. Desmond Manderson’s
latest work–Kangaroo Courts and the Rule of Law: The Legacy of Modernism–
constitutes an ideal pre-text to undertake such endeavour.
My departing hypothesis is the following: Lawrence’s work reveals that the
experience of modernity depends on the contexts in which it is produced, therefore
disclosing different ways of being modern in Australia and Mexico. The dream of
modernity developed into distinctive nightmares in each of these countries. This
article thus aims to extend Manderson’s ‘law and literature’ by analysing the
‘Mexican novel’ written by the very author he chose to develop his theory: D.H.
Lawrence. In other words, it offers a jurisprudential reading of two of Lawrence’s
novels–Kangaroo and The Plumed Serpent–alongside one another. In doing so it
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Manderson’s engagement with Lawrence
and addresses some of the limitations in his critique of positivism which are implicit
in his focus on Lawrence’s Australian novel, rather than in the continuum of his
work–including his Mexican stories.
I must explicitly affirm that Manderson’s latest work must be read not only as a
keystone for an authentic renaissance of the field of law and literature, but also as a
groundbreaking contribution to contemporary jurisprudence that interrogates and
challenges the very language in which we are used to think about law. Kangaroo
Courts makes a strong case for a post-positivist rule of law that is based upon a
literary experience of justice. This post-positivist rule of law intends to be equidistant,
on the one hand, from positivism’s confidence in the emancipatory potential of purely
logical systems, objective rules and abstract reason and, on the other hand, from
romanticism’s appeal to some transcendent ideal of justice situated outside of the
parameters of legal rules but, at the same time, capable of overcoming and redeeming
them. Manderson defends a model of judgment in politics, law and literature that is
‘genuinely committed to undecidability, corrigibility and constant renewal’.4 Draw-
ing upon the intersections between D.H. Lawrence’s literary experience while writing
Kangaroo and the theoretical work of Jacques Derrida and Mikhail Bakhtin,
Manderson argues that ‘this openness to conversation, revision and to judgment as
a process of learning through discourse, does not destroy the rule of law but gives it a
3See, for example, Habermas (1981), pp 444–464; Foucault (1994 [1984]), pp 679–688; Kant
(2008 [1784]), pp 25–33; Adorno and Horkheimer (2012 [1944]).
4Manderson (2012a), p 6.

































new honesty, a new dignity and a new legitimacy’.5 Most importantly, Manderson
contends that ‘if we look around the world at societies in transition, and the profound
legal problems they face’, a dialogic construction of the rule of law seems ‘a more
important goal to advance than an ill-fated promise of [positivist] objectivity that is
increasingly viewed as without credibility’.6
New theories call for new academic styles. The ‘dialogic imagination’ in which
Manderson grounds his literary and intersubjective legal methodology7 is itself a
seductive invitation to dialogue. I intend to test Manderson’s (Australian) legal
methodology with the troubled (Mexican) experience of modernity, as it is
channelled through D.H. Lawrence’s novel The Plumed Serpent. By applying
Manderson’s methodology to the Mexican story that Lawrence told immediately
after he transmuted his Australian experience into Kangaroo I pursue to show the
huge contribution that Manderson’s theoretical elaboration on law and literature
entails to our understanding and criticism of legal modernity, while making evident
what I regard as its main weaknesses: the treatment of both D.H. Lawrence and
modernity as uniform objects of study.
Manderson’s methodology can be summarised in three steps. First, he con-
textualises Kangaroo among the Western cultural tendencies that were prevalent in
1922, that is, the year in which this novel was written. By 1922, according to
Manderson, the idea of a ‘crisis of modernity’ was ‘already shorthand for a
comprehensive loss of faith in the foundations of the modern world’.8 Second, he
carefully develops a close reading of Kangaroo that stresses not the contents of the
novel, but its modernist style: the fractured subjectivities that are portrayed in its
pages, along with the formal inventiveness of Lawrence’s language. Third, he
stretches Lawrence’s understanding of language and literature in order to include
legal discourses in it. This allows Manderson to address, on the one hand, the social
and political criticism of Australian modernity that Lawrence implemented through
Kangaroo and, on the other hand, the ideological limits of legal positivism. In my
opinion, this third methodological step requires some pluralist nuances as the elision
in Manderson’s work of Lawrence’s treatment of Mexican modernity places in
contention the basis for his critique of legal positivism outside the Australian context.
Manderson maintains that ‘Lawrence did not think of a story as the handing
over of some truth or other from writer to reader, but rather as a process by which
the writer learns something through writing just as the reader learns through
reading’.9 In other words, Manderson claims that Lawrence conceives writing as a
way of learning through imaginative experience. This conception of writing,
according to Manderson, is central to Lawrence’s views on literature, politics and
justice. Yet Manderson offers us a still picture of Lawrence’s work that is mainly
focused on Kangaroo. If writing was a learning process for Lawrence, it seems
reasonable to assume that his Australian novel does not embody his last word on
these issues. Kangaroo was written in the south coast of Sydney, at the seaside town
5Manderson (2012a), p 7.
6Manderson (2012a), p 168.
7Manderson (2012a), pp 92–96.
8Manderson (2012a), p 29.
9Manderson (2012a), p 56.

































of Thirroul, where Lawrence and his wife Frieda stayed for six weeks during the
Australian winter of 1922. They migrated a few months later to the United States. In
the spring of 1923, Lawrence went down to Mexico, where he conceived and wrote
the first draft of Quetzalcoatl (later titled The Plumed Serpent), the third and last of
his (in)famous ‘leadership novels’–after Aaron’s Rod (1922) and Kangaroo.
The common tenet of the ‘leadership novels’ is an outright hostility towards the
emancipatory horizons of bourgeois modernity. Critics often regard these three
novels as a direct expression of Lawrence’s proto-fascist propensities.10 However, a
novel is not a political treatise, as Raymond Williams effectively acknowledged when
he dismissed as a plain matter of ignorance the rebuke of Lawrence as a precursor of
fascism.11 Depicting an authoritarian leadership cult or using a proto-fascist
ideology as subject matter for a novel, even sympathetically at moments, does not
necessarily indicate an endorsement of fascist politics.12 Manderson’s approach to
Kangaroo avoids the naiveté of translating Lawrence’s plot and characters into direct
and transparent expressions of his political thought. He convincingly argues that this
novel does not represent a notorious instance of Lawrence’s reactionary ideology,
but it rather ushers in a quite relevant moment of vacillation in his political thought
that ended in his rejection of the romantic dream of authoritarian transcendence.13
This essay asserts that Lawrence’s repudiation of ‘leadership’ politics continued
and reached its zenith in The Plumed Serpent. Following Manderson’s methodolo-
gical route I will show, by contextualising The Plumed Serpent in its Mexican
scenery, that the gloomy style of this novel imposes crucial nuances on any
jurisprudential reading of Lawrence’s views on the ongoing crises of modernity
and their effects on our conceptions of law and justice. In other words, I contend that
Lawrence’s Australian jurisprudence is different from Lawrence’s Mexican jurispru-
dence because, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos observes in his sociological critique of
globalisation, different actors in historical processes tend to see the same develop-
ments at different scales depending on their contexts, leading the way to mixtures
(and clashes) of different forms of law.14
I have thus divided my reflections on Manderson’s take on law and literature
into three sections. First, I will explain Manderson’s characterisation of D.H.
Lawrence’s novel Kangaroo as ‘“law and literature” avant the lettre’15 that, along
with the theoretical work of Derrida and Bakhtin, ‘offers us a theory of justice born
of the crisis of modernity and forged in the practice of literature’.16 In the next
section I will address the cultural context in which The Plumed Serpent was written,
mirroring this way Manderson’s methodology that explicitly situates Kangaroo
within the frame of the non-reactionary modernism that emerged as a response to the
disillusionments of World War I. In the last section, I will briefly outline a
contextualised jurisprudential reading of The Plumed Serpent that is framed in the
10Guttmann (1964); Millett (1971 [1970]), p 281.
11Williams (1968 [1958]), p 199.
12Smith (2002), p 7.
13Manderson (2012a), pp 96–97.
14Sousa Santos (1995), pp. 456–478.
15Manderson (2012a), p 21.
16Manderson (2012a), p 7.

































pragmatic–and murderous–upheavals of the Mexican Revolution. This will set the
argument to conclude that the triumph of political authoritarianism in Mexico, as
recounted and predicted by Lawrence, restates both the theoretical importance of
(legal) contexts and the emancipatory possibilities of legal positivism as a response to
the problems that ‘societies in transition’–to keep up with Manderson’s termino-
logy–still face today. Let us remember that Montesquieu once wrote that ‘[t]he
political liberty of the citizen is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each
person has of his own safety’.17 This is precisely one of the key virtues of positivism:
it compels law to provide every individual with certainty about how to conduct his/
her social and political life by calculating the legal consequences of his/her actions
and, specifically, of the exercise of his/her rights.
Thirroul of Law or, the literary horizons of a post-positivist rule of law
Kangaroo Courts constitutes the height of the recent work that Desmond Manderson
has developed around the nexus between ‘law and literature’ and the rule of law.18
His approach to this matter is unique in its earnest comprehension of both literary
theory and the aesthetic aspects of literary texts. Manderson rightly observes that
back to their very origins the discourses constructed around the conjunction of ‘law
and literature’ have suffered from two structural weaknesses: first, ‘a concentration
on substance and plot’; and, second, ‘a salvific belief in the capacity of literature to
cure law or perfect its justice’.19 The first fails to question the ‘mimetic fallacy’20
which regards the imitation of nature or reality as the main function of art.21 The
second fails to question the ‘romantic fantasy’22 which sets the purpose of art in
‘healing the world’s wounds’.23
Manderson contends that what makes literature worth reading is neither its
coherence with the world, nor the morality it endorses. The ideals of modernism,
which so dramatically transformed the landscape of literature, philosophy and
politics around the turn of the twentieth century, completely reject the aesthetic
aspirations that underlie the mimetic and romantic fallacies. Modernist texts are
noteworthy because of their quest for aesthetic autonomy through ‘the eternal
recurrence of play and form and the priority of voice over event’.24 From a
modernist perspective, thus, reading a novel as a ‘normative framework to convey
information concerning “the real world”’ miserably forsakes to appreciate ‘the
dimensions of form and style in works of literature as central elements of our
experience and enjoyment of them’.25 Modernism simply has not happened yet in the
academic field that we call ‘law and literature’ as it clings to a time ‘before the crisis
17Montesquieu (1979 [1784]), vol 1, p 294. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are mine.
18See Manderson (2011), (2012b,c,d).
19Manderson (2012a), p 9.
20Manderson (2011), pp 108–118; (2012a), pp 10–17.
21See, for example, West (1985, 1986); Posner (1986); Nussbaum (1995); Lacey (2008).
22Manderson (2011), pp 118–121; (2012a), pp 17–20.
23See, for example Nussbaum (1995); Ward (2003); Williams (2005).
24Manderson (2012a), p 16.
25Manderson (2011), pp 116–117.

































of modernity’ that shook both law’s and literature’s claims to ‘the certainty and
objectivity of the written text’.26 In this regard, it must be noted that while
modernism and modernity are related, they should also be sharply distinguished. The
term modernism refers to the specific cultural forms–notably to experimental art and
writing–accompanying the developments of modernity in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century.27
The ascension of modernism overlaps with the ‘crisis of modernity’–it must be noted
thatManderson regularly uses the noun ‘crisis’ in its singular form–that was triggered by
World War I, which in turn virtually destroyed the trust in the systems, beliefs and
institutions whereon the so-called Western civilization was erected: reason, science,
liberal democracy, capitalism and industrialisation. To put it briefly, Manderson
regards modernism as a response to the ‘crisis of modernity’ that implies ‘a commitment
to individual over social good, a sense of rootlessness and exile, and, coupled with an
emphasis on the varieties and uncertainties of individual subjectivity, the most
comprehensive critiques of representation and the most radical experiments in form’.28
In each of the arts, stylistic variation and reinterpretation–even parody or
pastiche–of the past canon were central to the modernist period. In the literary field,
modernism entails therefore an understanding of literature ‘as a site of questions not
of answers, of the creation of textual doubt and ambiguity not certainty’.29
Modernism destabilised the syntactic and logical articulations which had previously
communicated a story to the reader by focusing instead on fragmentation,
indeterminacy and singularity both in voice and perspective.30 Irony is thus central
to our understanding of literary modernism as it juxtaposes ‘the play of levels and
registers within a text, and the tensions between levels of meaning which thereby
undermine the most innocent of speech acts’.31
Nonetheless, the emergence of new artistic styles that stressed the importance of
subjective experience was not the only effect of the horrors that emerged from the
Great War’s trenches. Romanticism regained momentum. Even though liberals have
consistently identified romanticism either with reactionary or plainly totalitarian
politics,32 Manderson appropriately avoids this misleading account of its political,
philosophical and aesthetic ramifications. Based on the seminal work of M.H.
Abrams on romanticism, Manderson identifies as its central philosophical feature ‘a
metaphysics of integration, of which the key principle is that of the “reconciliation”
or synthesis of whatever is divided, opposed, and conflicting’.33 The romantic
26Manderson (2012a), p 20. For a comprehensive introduction to the development of ‘law and
literature’ within the history of literary and legal thought, see Binder and Weisberg (2000).
27Williams (1988 [1976]), pp 208–209; (2007 [1989]), p 32; Manderson (2012a), p 26.
28Manderson (2012a), p 27.
29Manderson (2011), p 108.
30Manderson (2012a), p 19. This is the case, just to mention a couple of examples, of James
Joyce’s Ulysses (first published in 1922), whose encyclopaedic intertextuality displays multiple
levels of conceptual and formal structures; or Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (first published
in 1927), which follows the stream of consciousness of its central characters through 24 hours.
31Manderson (2011), p 121; (2012a), p 17.
32Talmon (1960); Berlin (1999).
33Manderson (2012a), p 17; Abrams (1971), pp 177–183.

































sensibility is bound up with the painful conviction that in modern capitalism
something precious has been lost, at the level of both individuals and humanity at
large. Romanticism resists therefore the alienation of certain essential human values–
qualitative values as opposed to the purely quantitative exchange value that
predominates in capitalist modernity–and promises instead the overcoming of
difference, the accomplishment of inward plenitude and the instauration of harmony
among human beings.
Manderson diagnoses a growing dilemma between introspection, individual self-
assertion, and the claims of the collective among Western intellectuals as modernism
moved in crescendo into the political tensions of the 1920s. In the years that followed
World War I ‘many writers, artists and thinkers were virulently opposed to the legal
and social history of positivism and rejected in almost identical terms its obsession
with mechanics, systems, technology and rules’.34 In the writings of the German
New Romantics–Eugen Diederichs, Paul de Lagarde and Julius Langbehn, among
other authors–‘we can observe the same fusion of nature, tradition, custom, religion;
the same belief in justice as hierarchical and leadership as manifest’.35 Manderson
maintains that this cultural mood fostered the reactionary constituent of modernism,
that is, ‘romanticism which has taken a political and nihilistic turn’.36
No author better shows the implications of this resurgent romantic spirit for the
rule of law than Carl Schmitt, whose work virtually dissolves law into the mutually
enticing forces of politics and emotions. Manderson acknowledges that the
association of Schmitt with romanticism is not obvious: his Politische Romantik–
published in 1919–is precisely ‘a vitriolic diatribe against political romanticism’.37
Nonetheless, Schmitt clearly fits into a pattern of antimodernist legality that
reinstates transcendent decision as the key element of the legal system. Manderson
contends that ‘[i]f he dismissed political romanticism as “the sovereignty of the ego”,
his solution merely substituted the egotism of the sovereign’ by transferring it to an
original and charismatic authority that is ‘underived from any institutional
structure’.38
Schmitt’s critique of legal positivism was forged out of the ashes of the Great
War. 1922 marks a critical turn in his thought. The publication that year of
Politische Theologie exhibited his decisive rejection of the liberal rule of law as
expressed through positivist legal theory. Contrarily to the basic idea of the rule of
law, which is expressed in the phrase ‘government by law and not by men’–that is,
that the government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it, making it possible for
individuals to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive
powers, and to plan their affairs on the basis of this knowledge,39 Schmitt had come
to believe that justice could not be achieved even by the best of rules. Schmitt’s
key theses can be encapsulated in the following threefold principle:(i) ‘Sovereign is
he who decides the exception’; (ii) ‘[t]he exception is that which cannot be subsumed
34Manderson (2012a), p 40.
35Manderson (2012a), p 41.
36Manderson (2012), p 15.
37Manderson (2012a), p 42; Schmitt (2011 [1919]).
38Manderson (2012a), p 43; Schmitt (2011 [1919]), p 65.
39Raz (1977), pp 195–198.

































[… it] appears in its absolute form when a situation in which legal prescriptions can
be valid must first be brought about’; and (iii) ‘[t]he exception in jurisprudence is
analogous to the miracle in theology’.40 For Schmitt, justice was not found in legal
structures but in their exceptions; not determined by reference to established
procedures but by summoning the voice of the people and the force of the leader
who would condense and amplify it.
The exasperation that Schmitt and the New Romantics expressed about the
logical and moral limits of positivism resonates today in us as forcefully as it did in
1922. The attack on the Twin Towers and their collapse on 11 September 2001 gave
birth to the brave new world of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. Both listlessness
in regulating economic powers and corruption have spread all over the world
dystopian realities in the form of a devastating economic crisis.41 Law seems helpless
to constrain public powers that have resuscitated a Hobbesian conception of
untrammelled sovereignty as well as private powers that do not accept any legal
constraints in their quest for profit.
Manderson compellingly claims that the traditional positivist conceptions of
language, objectivity and meaning in law seem highly inefficient to address these
challenges. The rule of law is lethally imperilled, but we still do not have anything to
replace it. Manderson thus asserts that D.H. Lawrence’s work constitutes a timely
platform for reassessing our problems with justice and judgement because no less
than him ‘we still face the terrible problem of what to do once we can no longer
believe in our old habits of thought: for belief has died though the habit of believing
lingers on’.42Kangaroo responds to the disorientation caused by the Great War and its
implications for art, politics and law through a faithful depiction of the allure that
emanates from totalising ideologies that promise the redemption of justice and
community under the authority of a wise and loving leader–Duce, Führer or Caudillo.
Lawrence, however, ultimately recoils from them and renounces his own fondness for
authoritarian politics. He actually changed his mind about the need of leadership for
achieving justice as he was writing the leadership novels. In a much quoted letter
written to Witter Bynner, dated 13 March 1928, Lawrence categorically asserted:
The hero is obsolete, and the leader of men is a back number. After all, at the back of
the hero is the militant ideal: and the militant ideal, or the ideal militant seems to me
also a cold egg. We’re sort of sick of all forms of militarism and militantism […] the
leader-cum-follower relationship is a bore. And the new relationship will be some sort of
tenderness, sensitive, between men and men and men and women, and not the one up
one down, lead on I follow, ich dien sort of business.43
Manderson’s reading of Lawrence’s Kangaroo as a dialogic and polyvalent text
provides us with a basis to state that this letter does not inaugurate a new stage in
Lawrence’s thought but rather continues an earlier one whose origins can be traced
40Schmitt (1985 [1922]), pp 5, 13, 36.
41For a recent account on the present worldwide dystopian realities, see the section titled
“Seeds of Dystopia” in World Economic Forum (2012), pp 16–19.
42Manderson (2012a), p 3.
43Lawrence (1991), p 321.

































to his brief sojourn in Australia.44 In Kangaroo, Lawrence tells the story of Richard
Lovatt Somers, his own alter ego, an English writer whom a group of war veterans
who call themselves ‘Diggers’ tries to recruit to the cause of a rightwing takeover in
Australia. The righteous authority of their leader, a lawyer born Benjamin Cooley
and known as ‘Kangaroo’, is their only political creed. Kangaroo summarises his
view on the polity and the role the leader plays in it in the following terms:
I want to keep order. I want to remove physical misery as far as possible […] And that
you can only do by exerting strong, just power from above […] The secret of life is in
obedience […] And he [man] needs to be relieved from this terrible responsibility of
governing himself when he doesn’t know what he wants, and has no aim towards which
to govern himself. Man again needs a father […] Man needs a quiet, gentle father who
uses his authority in the name of living life, and who is absolutely stern against anti-life.
I offer no creed. I offer myself, my heart of wisdom, strange warm cavern where the
voice of the oracle steams in from the unknown; I offer my consciousness, which hears
the voice; and I offer my mind and my will, for the battle against every obstacle to
respond to the voice of life, and to shelter mankind from the madness and the evil of
anti-life.45
According to Manderson, Kangaroo’s pretended legitimacy comes from ‘the
ability of a true leader to act wisely outside of the rules, to realize that the unity of
the people transcends vested interests, and to receive the allegiance of his subjects
[…] by virtue of his natural and manifest authority’.46 This is certainly an accurate
reading of the novel. Somers initially succumbs to the seduction of these ideals of
cohesive community and charismatic leadership as Kangaroo directly appeals to his
contempt for egalitarianism and corrupt modernity. He regards Australia as a
loathsome ‘terre democratic’ without any sense of ‘class distinction’, where ‘[t]he
proletariat appoints men to administer the law, not to rule’.47 Somers craves instead
‘[t]he mystery of lordship […] the mystic recognition of difference and innate
priority, the joy of obedience and the sacred responsibility of authority’ that
‘democracy and equality try to deny and obliterate’.48
Manderson suggests that to understand Kangaroo’s argument properly we must
pay attention not just to Somers, but to all its characters and to the different voices
that struggle in each character’s conscience.49 Somers’ voice in the novel is
constantly undermined and destabilised by others voices: by the narrator, by his
wife Harriet and even by Somers himself through an internal dialogue between the
yearning to lose himself in collective unity and the desire for solitude. Somers
44Philip Sicker (1992) argues that Lawrence’s retreating from leadership politics lasted only
until 1929, at which time his Grand Inquisitor essay reasserted the importance of the hero.
However, as Jad Smith (2002, p 21) observes, the question of whether or not Lawrence
eventually reaffirmed his interest in leadership politics matters less than his hesitation while he
was writing the ‘leadership novels’.
45Lawrence (1923), pp 126–128.
46Manderson (2012a), p 58.
47Lawrence (1923), p 18.
48Lawrence (1923), p 121.
49Manderson (2012a), p 125.

































repeatedly berates himself as he acknowledges he is merely a ‘preacher and a
blatherer’, a plain fool and even a ‘beastly’ and ‘detestable little brat’.50
Indeed, Harriett’s is the most powerful voice that subverts Somers’ pretensions.51
Manderson calls our attention to a particular example which illustrates how
Lawrence ironically modulates his own voice, citing his own opinions in contexts
that subtly disrupt them.52 On a cold day at the beach, Lawrence tells us, Somers’
hat is caught by the wind and carried into the waves. He clumsily manages to rescue
it.53 Chilled and wet, he continues to lecture Harriet on the way home about the
convenience of reawakening ‘the aristocratic principle’ that advocates the recogni-
tion of ‘the innate difference between people’. Harriet retorts brutally: ‘Aristocratic
principle! […] You should have seen yourself, flying like a feather into the sea after
your hat’.54 Later, Somers sits in a little barrel with a rusty tin-lid to warm himself
near the fire. She pours scorn on him again: ‘Old tin lids! How can you sit on it? […]
Is that your aristocratic principle?’55
The novel’s embodiment in multiple characters provides resistance to the claims
and arguments of each of them. Somers’ engagement in active dialogue with other
characters’ voices transmutes his viewpoints about politics and justice. As Somers
gradually abdicates the hierarchical and collectivist creed he endorsed at the time he
arrived in Australia, he ruminates that ‘[l]ife makes no absolute statement […
because] Life is so wonderful and complex, and always relative’.56 In the end, he
refuses to be seduced by the promises of any man to truly possess the insight and
authority that Kangaroo vindicates. Somers just wants to be left ‘alone by himself,
alone with his own soul, alone with his eyes on the darkness which is the dark god of
life’.57 Thus, he finally declines Kangaroo’s suffocating embrace:
It’s the will-to-love that I hate, Kangaroo […] Don’t love me. Don’t want to save
mankind. You’re so awfully general, and your love is so awfully general […] Don’t want
me to love you. Let’s be hard, separate men […] you’re such a Kangaroo, wanting to
carry mankind in your belly-pouch, cozy, with its head and long ears peeping out. You
sort of figure yourself a Kangaroo of Judah, instead of a Lion of Judah: Jehovah with a
great heavy tail and a belly-pouch. Let’s get off it, and be men, with the gods beyond us.
I don’t want to be godlike, Kangaroo. I like to know the gods beyond me. Let’s start as
men, with the great gods beyond us.58
50Lawrence (1923), pp 319, 327–328, 332.
51Kate Millett (1971 [1970], p 280–283) derides Kangaroo for its ‘heavy emphasis on masculine
privilege, politics, and the public life, from which females, citizens or not, are jealously
excluded’. I believe that an unbiased reading of Harriet’s role in the development of the ideas
that are the novel’s real protagonists inflicts some serious nuances on this critical judgement.
52Manderson (2012a) pp 125-6.
53Lawrence (1923), p 322.
54Lawrence (1923), p 325.
55Lawrence (1923), p 326
56Lawrence (1923), p 314.
57Lawrence (1923), p 330.
58Lawrence (1923), p 245.

































Why did Lawrence turn his back on reactionary romanticism in this way?
Manderson thinks that the answer lies in the novel itself. Mikhail Bakhtin’s writings
on the novel provide us with the necessary elements to understand Lawrence’s
ideological evolution through Kangaroo. Bakhtin highlights the novel as an
inherently fragmentary and double-voiced genre. The most powerful feature which
Bakhtin recognizes in the novel is its heteroglossia or polyphony, its characteristic
multiplication of voices and perspectives. In speech, ‘every word is directed toward
an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it
anticipates’.59 The novel reproduces this aesthetical, as well as ethical, quality of
speech.
Bakhtin defines the novel as ‘a diversity of social speech types (sometimes even
diversity of languages) and a diversity of individual voices, artistically organized’.60
Its distinctive ‘dialogic imagination’ gives a particular voice to each of the characters
and sets these voices against one another. The novel’s multiple voices appear in
many different mutual relations–of stylisation, parody, hidden polemic, and so on.
Along these lines, the novel points not just to a mosaic of voices, but at the same
time to their transformation under the communicative pressure of their contexts of
utterance. This is what Bakhtin means when he speaks about the novel as a literary
genre that is basically ‘dialogized, permeated with laughter, irony, humor’ and
‘elements of self-parody’, and also imbued with ‘indeterminacy, a certain semantic
open-endedness’ and ‘a living contact with unfinished, still-evolving and contem-
porary reality’.61
If we read Kangaroo from a Bakhtinian perspective, we will most probably
conclude–as Manderson does–that Lawrence did not write Kangaroo, but Kangaroo
rewrote Lawrence.62 Bakhtin’s claims are both echoed in D.H. Lawrence’s own
essays on the novel, and performed in his ‘leadership novels’.63 In his ‘Study of
Thomas Hardy’, Lawrence contends that an authentic work of art ‘must contain the
essential criticism of the morality to which it adheres’ in order to create ‘the conflict
necessary to every tragic conception’.64 Kangaroo similarly refers to the ‘laws of
polarity’, which are described as the movement between two flows, one sympathetic
and loving, the other mighty and authoritarian. Lawrence writes that ‘[i]n the
absolute triumph of either flow lies the immediate surety of [human] collapse’.65
The Great War, Manderson argues, brought on the crisis which stimulated
Lawrence to work through the tensions between opposing principles that he refused
to cap by a fruitless appeal to some ideal state of concord. Kangaroo embodies ‘an
earnest if perverse commitment: not to resolve its contradictions and tensions but to
see in them its main character’s essential activity’.66 Polarity is neither synthesis nor
harmony, but plain opposition between ‘forces that cannot be compromised since we
59Bakhtin (1981 [1975]), p 280.
60Bakhtin (1981 [1975]), p 262.
61Bakhtin (1981 [1975]), p 7.
62Manderson (2012a), pp 90–111.
63Manderson (2012a), pp 142–144, 152; Hyde and Clark (1993–1994), pp 140–141.
64Lawrence (1985), p 89.
65Lawrence (1923), pp 354–355.
66Manderson (2012c), p 492.

































are committed too much to both’.67 As Paul Eggert puts it, the literary methodology
of polarity underscores the fragility, provisionality and temporariness of every
textual medium and expresses an unremitting willingness to revise, rethink and renew
our social conditioning, historical contextualisation, and epistemic and discursive
formations.68 It is Manderson’s theoretical merit to have envisioned a method to
examine and criticise legal discourses through Lawrence’s polarity.
In sum, Lawrence believed that we should not try to eliminate or conciliate
contradictory beliefs, arguments or expectations, but rather draw our strength from
them. ‘A man’s soul is a perpetual call and answer’, Lawrence writes.69 Polarity is
precisely the main tenet of the post-positivist conception of the rule of law that
Manderson names, after Kangaroo, ‘Thirroul of Law’. Call and answer: the rule of
law consists in a public debate of (legal) reasons which acknowledges the
unfeasibility of interpretative closure in face of the plurality and singularity of
circumstances that characterise legal work. Manderson argues that the literary
modernism of Bakhtin and Lawrence entails a crucial public dimension through
which the pressure of conveying and justifying our judgements to others transforms
our understanding of the rule of law into ‘a set of ideas that institutionally protect
the social and dialogic process of exposing and critiquing reasons for decision, rather
than as a set of ideas that institutionally entrench the hierarchical or hieratical
process of announcing them’.70
According to Manderson, Derrida makes a similar point when he addresses the
unavoidable aporias that burden legal judgment: ‘for a decision to be just and
responsible, it must […] be regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the
law and also destroy or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, rejustify
it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its
principle’.71 In other words, legal judgment is permanently torn between two
contradictory directions: on the one hand, the abstract rule; on the other hand, the
uniqueness of the particular case that cannot be settled in advance. Legal judgment
cannot choose ‘between justice (infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign
to symmetry) and the exercise of justice as law or right, […] calculable, a system of
regulated and coded prescriptions’.72 The endless cycle of tensions, oppositions and
disagreements between prior rules and new circumstances render legal decision
basically unstable and imperfect.
Manderson’s approach to law and literature is deeply bound up in our present
imperfection, our fragmentation and the imperfection and fragmentation of justice
with us. Manderson opposes the configuration of ‘Thirroul of Law’ both against
positivists’ assertion of law’s perfection and the romantics’ of its perfectibility–the
former ‘a claim of purity centered on the past’ and the second ‘a dream of it
focused on the future’.73 The reconfiguration of the positivist rule of law into the
67Manderson (2012c), p 493.
68Eggert (1999).
69Lawrence (1923), p 314.
70Manderson (2012a), p 159.
71Manderson (2012a), p 166; Derrida (1990), p 961.
72Derrida (1990), p 959.
73Manderson (2012a), p 178.

































post-positivist ‘Thirroul of Law’ has therefore, at least, three salient features. First,
‘the rule of law is not the outcome of a foundation, but a process of continually
putting them [foundations] in question’. Second, ‘the rule of law is governed by
reasons rather than a singular or categorical reason’. Third, ‘the rule of law does not
present commandments that are handed down to us, but a discourse by which the
law learns from us, paying attention to new circumstances and individual lives’.74
This way, ‘Thirroul of Law’ moves beyond romantic transcendence by acknow-
ledging that we have not lost the foundations of law in the chasms of modernity, but
have always lacked them.75 Manderson concludes that ‘Thirroul of Law’ does not
advance certainty, but enshrines uncertainty by acknowledging ‘trial and error’ as
the legal method par excellence.76 In this view, argument and doubt are not a mark
of law’s failure but of its success. It seems to me, however, that the methodology of
transparency, justification and response that is advocated by Manderson actually
presupposes to a certain extent not only a liberal public sphere, but also the logical
and linguistic certitude that positivism praises as modern law’s virtues. In order to
prove this, we must follow D.H. Lawrence in his literary expedition to Mexico–the
very antipodes of Australia. Just as Manderson frames Kangaroo in the cultural
aftermath of the Great War, I will contextualise The Plumed Serpent in its own
Mexican historical setting in order to disclose Lawrence’s views on a different model
of modernity and their implications for our own understanding of law.
Mexico, 1923–1925: looking into the abyss of sovereignty
Manderson claims that the jurisprudential methodology he develops in Kangaroo
Courts is not only ‘about a book and how it still speaks to us’, but also ‘about a time
and how it still resonates in us’.77 What was ‘in the air’ in 1922–at the time Lawrence
wrote Kangaroo–Manderson argues, ‘was modernity, modernism and the modern’.78
Drawing on Manderson’s methodology, a reader of The Plumed Serpent should
therefore ask what was in the air when Lawrence visited Mexico. The answer to this
question is, as Manderson suggests, modernity. It was, however, a kind of modernity
quite different from the one that Lawrence experienced either in Europe or Australia:
it was a cynical, baroque and cold-hearted yet irrational way of being modern.
Lawrence drafted The Plumed Serpent during a visit to Chapala, Mexico, in 1923
and finished it during a stay in Oaxaca from 1924 to 1925. Even though Mexico is
the scenario in which the action of The Plumed Serpent takes place, critics have
frequently neglected to situate its narrative in a specifically Mexican context. L.D.
Clark emphatically states that ‘[t]he political events recounted in The Plumed Serpent
bear no more than a general resemblance to those taking place in Mexico in the
twenties’.79 John B. Vickery claims that ‘it is the book most commonly thought of as
74Manderson (2012a), pp 179–180.
75Manderson (2012a), pp 150–152.
76Manderson (2012), p 23; (2012c), p 504.
77Manderson (2012a), p 25.
78Manderson (2012a), p 26.
79Clark (1964), p 76.

































“mythic” in the entire Lawrence canon’.80 Peter Fjågesund insists that Lawrence
places ‘almost exclusively European, or at least Western’ concerns at the centre of its
narrative.81
Jeffrey Meyers imputes this intentional obliviousness either to the resistance of
literary scholars ‘who know nothing of Mexican history’ to learn something about it;
or to the surreptitious conversion of the ‘political realities and totalitarian ideology
of the novel’ into ‘a more vague and acceptable mythology’ by Lawrence’s admirers.
I think Meyers is a bit too harsh with his colleagues. Mexican history is really
difficult to understand–even for Mexicans–and The Plumed Serpent is certainly not
an easy and relaxing reading. Meyers, however, correctly asserts that ‘it is
illuminating to study the novel in its historical context, for Lawrence was thoroughly
familiar with the contemporary political situation in Mexico, and […] it is precisely
this montage of myth and Realpolitik that gives the book its unusual and disturbing
qualities’.82
I do not intend to describe here, as Meyers does, the sheer historical facts that
framed Lawrence’s stay in Mexico.83 What I would like to accentuate instead is the
cultural context in which Lawrence wrote The Plumed Serpent. Just as he did in
Australia before, Lawrence showed an uncanny ability to channel onto his writing
the land, the people, the language and the ways of life he witnessed in Mexico.84
Willard Johnson (who is represented as Bud Villiers in the novel) reports that, during
his stay in Chapala, Lawrence ‘read Mexican history and folklore and […] somehow
got the spirit of the place’.85
On 16 March 1925, a headline on the front page of Excélsior–a leading Mexican
newspaper–confirmed Johnson’s view on Lawrence’s nexus with Mexico. The
caption reads: ‘D.H. Lawrence, el gran escritor Inglés, nos visita y nos comprende’
[‘D.H. Lawrence, the great English writer, visits us and understands us’].86 What is
noteworthy about this comment is the contention that Lawrence actually understands
Mexico and the Mexicans. The early reception of The Plumed Serpent–and Lawrence
himself–in Mexico was significantly positive. Bernardo Ortiz de Montellano, for
example, suggests that any educated reader should appreciate Lawrence’s poetical
unveiling of ‘the hidden truth about Mexico and the Mexicans’ in the novel.87
Antonio de Castro Leal concurs in the belief that Lawrence had achieved a deep
understanding of Mexico’s reality and praises The Plumed Serpent as ‘a subtle travel
notebook, a fictional and symbolic narrative’ and ‘a profession of faith’.88 The
exiled Spanish poet Antonio Sánchez Barbudo, in his review of Mornings in Mexico
for the Mexican magazine El Hijo Pródigo, eulogised Lawrence as a ‘great traveler’
80Vickery (1972), p 505.
81Fjågesund (1991), p 137.
82Meyers (1974), p 56.
83For a brief yet comprehensive account of the Mexican Revolution, see Silva Herzog
(1960a,b).
84Manderson (2012a), pp 55–56.
85Villiers (1930), p 428, emphasis added.
86Quoted in Odio (1999), p 165.
87Ortiz de Montellano (1934), pp 182–183.
88Castro Leal (1942), p 187.

































who was able to look at Mexico with ‘ingenuousness’ and ‘purity’, thus yielding a
‘truthful’, ‘most vivid’ and ‘penetrating’ image of the country and its people that
honestly regarded indigenous Mexicans as creatures who lived ‘in a different
world’.89 As late as 1959, Octavio Paz celebrated The Plumed Serpent as a flawless
literary account of the cruelty and violence that permeate Mexican undomesticated
landscapes.90 To put it briefly, Mexican critics felt (at least before the consolidation
of Mexican post-revolutionary nationalism and the rise of post-colonial studies) that
Lawrence’s upsetting fiction mirrored their own experience of the Mexican Revolution
and its cultural, political and legal reverberations.
Kate Leslie–Lawrence’s heroine in The Plumed Serpent–defines Mexico as an
‘oppressive’, ‘gruesome’, ‘cruel’, ‘down-dragging’ and ‘destructive’ country.91 This
was indeed a precise description of Mexico’s social, economic and political
conditions between 1923 and 1925. Thirteen years of civil war had fragmented
authority, subverted the state apparatus, wrecked the country and decimated its
population. After an almost total military mobilisation of peasants and workers, the
government had been overthrown several times. In 1917, the constitution was
comprehensively rewritten. Railroads, bridges, mines, factories and haciendas alike
were destroyed in the brutal struggle between antagonistic revolutionary factions.
Whereas the 1910 census counted 15 million people in Mexico, the 1921 census
counted only 14 million.92 In other words, one out of eight Mexicans had been killed
between 1910 and 1921.93
The bloodshed had not ended by the time Lawrence arrived to Mexico.
Practically until the late 1930s Mexico was a tangible nightmare at whose heart
laid the spectre of violent death both for Mexicans and foreigners. The travel-
oriented literature about Mexico that was written by foreigners between 1920 and
1940 echoes these deeply inhospitable conditions.94
Lawrence was actually the first major figure to experience the horror of the
Mexican Revolution and to write about it for the English-speaking public.95 The
savagery of Mexican ambience is exhaustively commented in Lawrence’s corres-
pondence. As soon as he arrived in Mexico, he indignantly wrote to Knud Merrild
on 21 April 1923 that to live ‘even one mile outside’ a ‘village or town’ was
practically risking to be ‘robbed or murdered by roving bandits and scoundrels who
still call them revolutionaries’.96 On 27 June 1923 he warned Thomas Seltzer about
the ‘disheartening’ possibility of ‘a Catholic-reactionary revolution due about
89Sánchez Barbudo (1943), pp 58–59.
90Paz (2007 [1959]), pp 16–18.
91Lawrence (2009 [1926]), pp 33, 42.
92Aguilar Camín and Meyer (1991), p 87.
93Zoraida Vázquez (1989), pp 700–701. Lawrence was aware of the revolutionary death toll
and seemingly increased it for the sake of good fiction. A secondary character –young García–
declares in The Plumed Serpent that ‘the last census of Porfirio Díaz gave seventeen million
people’, while ‘the census of last year (circa 1923) gave only thirteen millions’. See Lawrence
(2009 [1926]), p 54.
94Walker (1978), pp 18–26. See, for example, Porter (1964), p 138; Greene (2002 [1939]), p 47.
95Walker (1978), pp 26–27.
96Lawrence (1987), p 430.

































September–which would mean bolshevist re-reaction in the spring’.97 A few months
later, on 19 November 1923, Lawrence wrote to Willard Johnson: ‘Everything a bit
heavier. They expect more revolution–Calles and De la Huerta–probably a bad one.
No business doing–and the common people a bit brutal’.98 In a similar tone, tainted
with racist remarks about the Mexican Indians, on 15 November 1924 he informed
Middleton Murry that Mexico ‘is always unsettled’ and ‘everything is so shaky and
really so confused’ partly because ‘[t]he Indians are queer little savages, and awful
agitators’.99
Lawrence’s Mexican experience is one of tumultuous political volatility and
absolute legal precariousness. Yet his account of singular atrocities is not quite as
relevant as his literary reconstruction of the cultural environment; that is, the multiple
and overlapping voices and discourses that made them possible. Lawrence under-
stood the uniqueness of the revolutionary moment in Mexico and honestly depicted
the appeal that gratuitous and unpunished violence has over individuals. Kangaroo
and the ‘Diggers’ would have turned pale with envy at the sight of the unbound
power concentrated in each of the Mexican struggling caudillos. The Mexican
Revolution opened Lawrence’s eyes to the limitless sovereignty of the great criminal
as both Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida have described it: not someone who
has committed this or that specific crime for which one feels a secret admiration, but
someone who, in defying the law, lays bare the violence of the juridical order
itself.100
José Juan Tablada, a Mexican poet who abominated the revolution (and accused
Lawrence of plagiarism),101 cunningly wrote in his diary in the first days of 1920:
‘Many soldiers […] ceased to be slaves […] to become tyrants on their own’.102 The
revolution transformed the vicious whims of the caudillos into current law. A glimpse
into the macabre stories collected by Martín Luis Guzmán, a privileged witness who
worked as Francisco Villa’s–one of the fiercest and most popular revolutionary
caudillos–private secretary, will indeed be very useful in order to imagine the
outrageous situation that Lawrence faced in Mexico. In El Águila y la Serpiente (The
Eagle and the Serpent), a fictionalised chronicle of the revolution that was first
published in 1928, Guzmán excoriates the propensity of the revolutionary caudillos
to pillage, rape, steal and murder while sarcastically designating their cruel
arbitrariness as ‘revolutionary justice’.103
Yet the most dreadful incident described by Guzmán is situated at the margins
between reality and legend: a condition, he says, that made it ‘worth of making
History’. Guzmán refers that Villa regarded the henchmen of Pascual Orozco, a rival
97Lawrence (1987), pp 464–465.
98Lawrence (1987), pp 536–537.
99Lawrence (1989), pp 167–168.
100Benjamin (1991 [1921]); Derrida (1990), p 987.
101Tablada published in 1924 La Resurrección de los Ídolos (The Resurrection of the Idols), a
‘theosophical-psychoanalytical-intuitive’ feuilleton about the return of the Aztec gods to
Mexico. This is the only likeness between Tablada’s fiction and The Plumed Serpent. See
Tablada (2003 [1924]).
102Tablada (1992), p 148.
103Guzmán (2010 [1928]), pp 199–208, 214–226.

































caudillo, as particularly odious traitors. In a battle involving both factions, Orozco’s
Colorados (‘red men’) were defeated and taken as prisoners by Villa’s soldiers. Villa
instructed Rodolfo Fierro–his most trusted lieutenant, also known as ‘El Carnicero’
(The Butcher)–to execute the Colorados before nightfall. Fierro decided then to
accomplish this order with ferocious creativity. He herded 300 prisoners into a cattle
pen. At its far end was a high adobe wall. Fierro used the few yards that separated
the cattle pen’s gate from the wall as an improvised shooting gallery where the
prisoners acted as moving targets. He fired at them while his orderly reloaded. The
prisoners were released 10 at a time: anyone who could reach and climb the wall
could go free. No prisoner was allowed to decline this deathly opportunity to escape:
anyone who refused to run towards the wall was immediately shot. ‘Come on, boys’,
Fierro called. ‘I’m the only one shooting, and I’m a bad shot’. It was a lie. After two
hours, Fierro succeeded in killing all the prisoners except one. Guzmán famously
titled this ghastly episode as La Fiesta de las Balas (Festival of the Bullets).104
Fierro’s deed illustrates the immense power displayed by the caudillos within
their precarious yet absolute jurisdiction. The random violence of the revolution
blurred the boundaries between animal and human–in Guzmán’s story, the Color-
ados were prodded, contained and killed as cattle–and, at the same time, granted the
caudillos semi-divine powers–Fierro literally mastered the life and death of 300
individuals in a single evening. Lawrence discussed hundreds of similar stories either
with boastful revolutionaries, disheartened victims or fearful foreigners.105 He
actually endured the stories of the pointless murders of one of his acquaintances
and a close friend in Mexico: respectively, the English novelist Wilfrid Ewart106 and
the American landlady Rosalie Evans.107 Witter Bynner reports that, after learning
about the fortuitous death of Ewart by a stray bullet during the wild celebrations of
New Year’s Eve, 1922, in Mexico City, Lawrence prompted a quick conclusion: ‘it’s
an evil country down there’.108
The ceaseless account of revolutionary atrocities produced a deep impression on
Lawrence, as it did on the female protagonist of The Plumed Serpent. In the novel,
for example, after hearing about the brutal murder of the manager of one of the
estates across the lake in Sayula, Kate feels that ‘doom and horror’ are written ‘in
the very sky’. Even though ‘she herself had seen no horrors […] And she had had
some exquisite moments [in Mexico …] she could not bear the unease, and the latest
sense of horror’.109
The return of the bloodthirsty Aztec gods in The Plumed Serpent is not merely a
fabrication of Lawrence’s feverish fantasy. In Mexico, Lawrence walked among
terrible demigods that pushed him to the verge of a Nietzschean moral panic: he
104Guzmán (2010 [1928]), pp 169–179.
105Bynner (1951), p 181. Regardless of Witter Bynner’s testimony about Lawrence being
‘haunted’ by the tales of violence that circulated in Mexico, this I can affirm with certainty:
my own grandparents possessed a rich collection of grim revolutionary anecdotes.
106González Rodríguez (2006), pp 9–42; Walker (1978), p 45.
107Walker (1978), p 57.
108Bynner (1951), p 17.
109Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 90.

































looked into the abyss of sovereignty, and the abyss looked back at him.110 From a
Derridean perspective we could say that Fierro’s ‘festival of bullets’ effectively shows
the inadequacy of theory and language to address so-called human realities. From a
legal and political standpoint, we could also affirm that the limits between humans,
animals and the gods are basically undecidable and porous, and that sovereignty
emerges from this very undecidability and porosity.111 Not all sovereigns, however,
are the same: I bet that, if they had been given the choice, the 299 Colorados that
were brought down by Fierro’s bullets would have preferred to be judged for their
actions under the objective rules and abstract reason of legal positivism.
Lawrence would probably have agreed with me. His friend Rosalie Evans was
assassinated in cold blood precisely because she insisted in formally vindicating in
Mexican courts and diplomatic forums her property over several haciendas against
the will of the revolutionary caudillos.112 Nonetheless, Lawrence was also interested
in unravelling the mystery of Mexico’s heart of darkness, to borrow Joseph Conrad’s
famous title. He thus went unashamed all the way through the attraction of the
limitless power of the caudillos. Drawing from Manderson’s methodology, I will
hence follow Lawrence in this path by analysing and questioning the fragmentary
and distinct voices that speak through the narrative fabric of The Plumed Serpent.
Reptilian courts or, the land of absolute undecidability
Mexico inspired a new turn in Lawrence’s polarities. The Plumed Serpent confronts its
readers with the hesitations of a European middle-aged woman–that is, a ‘civilised’
individual–between the thrill of untrammelled and–what is probably more important–
remorseless power, and the repulsion towards the terrifying violence that constitutes
both its basis and its most probable outcome. The novel tells the story of Kate Leslie, the
widow of an Irish patriot who visits Mexico with Owen Rhys, her American cousin.
Mexico oppresses and alienates Kate: it makes her feel ‘like a bird round whose body a
snake has coiled itself’.113 She constantly thinks of the country and its people with a
mixture of racist contempt and compassion that is epitomised in her feelings toward
Quetzalcoatl, the Mesoamerican deity of wind, light and wisdom whose name means
‘feathered serpent’. Kate regards Quetzalcoatl, Mexico and the Mexicans alike as
‘snakes coiled like excrement […] fanged and feathered beyond all dreams of dread’.114
In other words, Kate believes that the heavy coils and the sharp fangs of
Quetzalcoatl are too perceptible everywhere in Mexico. She is continuously aware of
the looming presence of death in the Mexican landscapes. She intensely dislikes the
Mexican Revolution’s egalitarian rhetoric as well as the violence it precipitates. In
Kate’s view, even though the Mexicans foolishly believe that ‘the revolutions have
been their revolutions, and they had won them all’, the truth is that ‘it was the army
110Nietzsche (2002 [1886]), p 69.
111Derrida (2008).
112Rosas Robles (2010).
113Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 63.
114Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 70.

































which had won all the revolutions’.115 She also disapproves the loutish hatred that
underlies the ‘famous revolutions’ that ‘began with Viva! but ended always with
Muera!’.
Kate believes that pre-Colombian Mexico ‘had had an elaborate ritual of death’.
By contrast, revolutionary Mexico transformed death into a ‘ragged, squalid, [and]
vulgar’ event, ‘without even the passion of its own mystery’. On the morning of her
fortieth birthday, Kate wonders why she had come ‘to this high plateau of death’.116
This question, in one form or another, becomes the central strain of the entire novel.
As the plot develops, a corollary question concerning Kate’s future takes over: will
she leave Mexico and abandon all it represents, or will she stay and submit to its
unremitting violence? ‘To Stay or Not to Stay’ is actually the title of the fourth
chapter.117 Lawrence gradually conducts the reader towards an understanding of the
profound meaning of Kate’s Mexican experience by tracing this dilemma to its
ultimate consequences.118 On the one hand, Lawrence tells us, for a 40 year old
woman, Europe represents ‘the consummatum est of her own spirit’. On the other
hand, the Mexican ‘heavy continent of dark-souled death was more than she could
bear’.119 Death lay behind her in Europe and before her in Mexico. Graham Hough
accurately describes Kate’s state of mind in the novel as ‘driven back and forth
between two repulsions rather than drawn by contrary attractions’.120
Kate gets eventually involved in the Quetzalcoatl movement, a quasi-religious
leadership cult started by two Mexicans of her acquaintance: Ramón Carrasco, a
historian and archaeologist, and Cipriano Viedma, a general. Ramón and Cipriano
intend to awaken the gods of the Aztec pantheon, including Quetzalcoatl and
Huitzilopochtli–the second being the deity of war, sun and human sacrifice. Ramón,
the movement’s charismatic leader, ultimately becomes the Living Quetzalcoatl,
whereas Cipriano incarnates Huitzilopochtli. Cipriano is a Mexican Indian,
unemotional and quiet yet vitally alert. He is nothing but ‘the inevitable Mexican
General, fascinated by the opportunity for furthering his own personal ambition and
imposing his own personal will’121 whenever he is on his own. He repeatedly urges
Ramón/Quetzalcoatl to consider various plans by which, backed by his army, both
of them might assume control of Mexico. However, Ramón/Quetzalcoatl disclaims
any interest in personal power and, under his influence, Cipriano becomes a divine
creature, ‘more than just a man’.122 Kate ritually marries Cipriano/Huitzilopochtli
and becomes herself in due course a goddess named Malintzi.123
115Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 7.
116Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 42
117Lawrence (2009 [1926]), pp 63–71.
118Walker (1978), pp 79–100.
119Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 43.
120Hough (1956), p 124.
121Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 229.
122Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 336.
123It must be noted that Malintzin (with a final ‘n’), known also as La Malinche, was not a
goddess in the Aztec pantheon but Hernán Cortés’ indigenous concubine, who played a major
role in the Spanish conquest of Mexico.

































Walter Benjamin’s well-known distinction between ‘divine’ and ‘mythic’ forms
of violence is certainly relevant here. Whereas mythical violence, says Benjamin, is
law-making; divine violence is law-destroying. Mythical violence sets boundaries,
creates guilt and retribution and is structured over threat; divine violence, on the
contrary, destroys boundaries, demands expiation and plainly strikes those who
challenge it. Mythical violence is mediated by law; divine violence is pure power and
truthful sovereignty.124 The Plumed Serpent delves into the dreadful accomplish-
ments of those human beings who seize divine violence. At a first moment, Cipriano
is just a public officer that stands ‘for the law and the constitution’.125 After his
transformation into Huitzilopochtli, his feats transcend legal rules (i.e. the realms of
mythical violence) and echo the unfathomable depths of divine violence. In Chapter
19 (‘The Attack on Jamiltepec’), for example, the reader witnesses the attempted
assassination of Ramón/Quetzalcoatl perpetrated by the Knights of Cortés, a
Catholic organisation.126 Later, during ‘Huitzilopochtli’s Night’ (Chapter 23), the
defeated assailants are accused of treason and pitilessly executed by Cipriano, who
acknowledges both Ramón/Quetzalcoatl and himself as ‘Lords of Life and Masters
of Death’. His sovereignty knows no restrictions: ‘Red Huitzilopochtli’ is responsible
for keeping ‘day and night apart’, that is, for separating ‘cowards’ and ‘traitors’
from ‘brave’ and ‘true men’.127
The novel strongly suggests that the old sovereign gods–‘those Aztec horrors’ as
Kate refers to them128–are steeped in blood, and that the only future this past will
engender is one fraught with senseless violence and death. The estrangement with the
Quetzalcoatl movement takes place in large part through the character of Kate,
whose perspective is significantly ambivalent as she feels ‘at once attracted and
repelled’ by it.129 She is ambiguous, indecisive and unsteady: in sum, an authentic
modernist narrator whose reflections Lawrence invites the reader to carefully distrust
and scrutinise.130
Kate is ‘shocked and depressed’ by the ritual execution of the ‘traitors’. She
dreads that Ramón/Quetzalcoatl and Cipriano/Huitzilopochtli have elevated ‘male
significance’ to a kind of ‘demonism’ that implies a continuous ‘exertion of pure,
awful will’. She holds a precarious fascination for these god-like men, but it remains
tinged with fear and even ‘revulsion’.131 The pride and strength of the old gods seem
to menace both her spirit and her womanhood. Thus, she finally decides to depart
from Mexico once and for all, but she changes her mind at the last moment, after
124Benjamin (1991 [1921]), pp 199–203.
125Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 72.
126In this part of the novel, the Catholic uprising known as La Cristiada (1926–1929) was
uncannily prophesised by Lawrence. For a thorough account of the causes, circumstances and
consequences of La Cristiada, see Meyer (1975).
127Lawrence (2009 [1926]), pp 343–351.
128Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 53.
129Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 109.
130Smith (2002 [1926]), p 16.
131Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 351.

































Cipriano reminds her that she belongs to him. ‘You won’t let me go!’, Kate
pathetically replies.132
Kate’s alleged obedience to Cipriano’s will has been continually discussed and
criticised as an expression of Lawrence’s desire to keep women under control.133 It
seems to me, however, that she is not as submissive as is commonly believed: if she
stays in Mexico it is because she has decided to do so, even though she needs to
believe that she has been compelled not to go.134 Kate does not surrender herself
completely to the Quetzalcoatl movement. She is aware of not being totally honest
with Ramón and Cipriano: ‘What a fraud I am!’, she thinks, ‘I know all the time it is
I who don’t altogether want them. I want myself to myself. But I can fool them so
they shan’t find out’.135 Significantly, Kate chooses to stay precisely because she
does not want to return to England, where as a 40 year old woman, she will probably
do no more than ‘sit in a London drawing-room, and add another to all the
grimalkins’. Kate reckons that her ‘ego’, her ‘individuality’ and even her life ‘are not
worth that ghastly price’.136 She therefore sacrifices her distinctive personality
because she wants to be ‘more than Kate’137: she prefers the hazardous excitement of
being Malintzi in Mexico than the boring security of a lonely widow in Europe.
Lawrence ends the novel on an intensely pessimistic note, with death floating in
the air. Ramón warns Kate about the fate of false gods: ‘they will murder you and
violate you, for having worshiped you […] Unless one gets one’s nobility from the
gods and turns to the middle of the sky for one’s power, one will be murdered at
last’.138 The price of the transcendence achieved by the impersonators of the old
gods consists in risking themselves to become victims of lethal and meaningless
violence. This can hardly be considered an advertisement either for leadership or
fascist politics. Both Somers’ internal dialogues in Kangaroo and Kate’s irresolute
musings in The Plumed Serpent bring several problems associated with authoritar-
ianism, irrationalism and violence to the foreground rather than advocating or
quietly brushing them aside.139
Nonetheless, the state of affairs that Kate faces in Mexico is quite different from
Somers’ findings in Australia: Kangaroo claimed to possess a privileged insight into
justice, whereas Ramón and Cipriano thrive over the uncertain character of
Quetzalcoatl. Kate recalls when she first learns about the sighting of the gods in
Sayula that, in Nahuatl–the language of the Aztecs–Quetzalcoatl is a compound
term: quetzal ‘is the name of a bird that lives high up in the mists of tropical
mountains, and has very beautiful tail feathers’; and coatl is merely ‘a serpent’. Kate
concludes that ‘[h]er Irish spirit was weary to death of definite meanings, and a God
132Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 404.
133See, for example, Millett (1971 [1970]), pp 283–285.
134In the first version of the novel Kate is last seen packing for England. See Lawrence (1998
[1995]), pp 321–326.
135Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 404.
136Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 399.
137Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 336.
138Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 397.
139Smith (2002), p 21.

































of one fixed purport’ after pondering the ‘confusion of contradictory gleams of
meaning’ in the name Quetzalcoatl. Gods, she thinks, ‘should be iridescent, like the
rainbow in the storm’.140 Later, when Kate asks a German resident in Mexico what
is ‘the idea’ that moves ‘the Men of Quetzalcoatl’, he replies: ‘I couldn’t say. Don’t
suppose they have any. But if they have, they won’t let on to you’.141 The
amorphous nature of Quetzalcoatl entails blurriness rather than polarity. Quetzal-
coatl announces and reflects at the same time the twisted logic of the Mexican
Revolution that rendered ‘liberty’ into ‘freedom to commit crime’.142
This is the key difference between the jurisprudential paradigms that respectively
underlie Kangaroo and The Plumed Serpent. In Australia, Ben Cooley’s desire of
unrestricted domination within a cohesive community was undermined by the
inherent contingency of the language that structures a tradition of well-established
liberties and democratic institutions. In Mexico, the impossibility of attaining a basic
consensus concerning the concepts and practices that ground fundamental political
and legal institutions generated the void in which Cipriano/Huitzilopochtli could
take hold of the power of gods and claim for himself the lordship of life and death.
The hazardous character that even today burdens Mexican legal and political
institutions is deeply rooted in the historical processes that determined the Mexican
Revolution, whose distinctive feature is the absence of intention, program or
ideology.143 The success of the Mexican Revolution was based on its emotive appeal
and mass constituency, not on its internal intellectual coherence or originality.
Francisco I. Madero, an aristocratic landowner and a convinced spiritist who had
been instructed by ‘spirits’ to guide Mexico towards democracy,144 launched the
Mexican Revolution in October 1910 by drawing up the ‘Plan de San Luis Potosí’, a
naïve manifesto that called for the institution of democracy through direct violent
action against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz.145 In May 1911 Díaz fled to France
and Madero called for elections. After a landslide victory, Madero incongruously
tried to implement a series of liberal and democratising reforms while conserving the
dictatorship’s army and most of its institutions. In February 1913, Madero was
finally overthrown and murdered by a group of disaffected army officers.
Madero failed to carry out his elusive political program, but he successfully
imploded the coercive mechanisms that structured the Díaz’ dictatorship. Thousands
of dispossessed peons, who had grown weary of their centennial poverty, chose to
rise up in arms once they were freed from the dictatorship’s shackles. As a result, the
revolution continued through the mobilisation of masses without any clear direction
or ideology. Other than achieving some sort of self-determinacy after the Díaz’
dictatorship, the rebels had no particular ideological drive. Thus, after Madero was
killed, none of the revolutionary factions was able to attribute a definite meaning to
the revolution.
140Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 51.
141Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 92.
142Lawrence (2009 [1926]), p 32.
143Paz (1994 [1950]), pp 137 ff.
144Madero (2000).
145This document is reprinted in Silva Herzog (1960a), pp 133–142.

































Madero’s murder inaugurated la bola, a vernacular and idiosyncratic form of
understanding the ‘revolution’. This Mexican idiom would surely have amused
Derrida as a delightful example of semantic undecidability. Bola can be translated as
‘ball’, ‘tangle’, ‘brawl’, ‘spontaneous gathering of people’ or ‘lie’. The term, which
was previously used as a synonym of cuartelazo (i. e. military uprising) during the
nineteenth century, conveys the idea that the Mexican Revolution was a disorderly
revolt lacking ideological coherence and a unified sense of purpose. In 1887, the
Mexican novelist and political theorist Emilio Rabasa prophetically contrasted the
concepts of ‘revolution’ and ‘bola’ in the following way:
Whereas the revolution spreads from an idea, develops national passion, modifies
institutions and demands the involvement of citizens, la bola does not demand or
represent principles: it is born and it is solved in a short natural and moral period, and
requires ignorance […] revolution is born out of the world’s progress, but la bola is born
out of ignorance: it is the unavoidable punishment of backward peoples.146
Ramón Eduardo Ruiz correctly suggests that, from 1905 until 1924, Mexico
underwent not a revolution, but a cataclysmic rebellion that basically involved fierce
factional squabbles.147 Each faction defined the revolution according to their own
strategic immediate needs. Perhaps nobody has expressed the conceptual vacuum
that underlies the Mexican Revolution as eloquently as Luis Cabrera, a Mexican
lawyer who defined it in plain tautological terms: ‘La Revolución es la Revolución’
(‘The Revolution is the Revolution’).148
Lawrence envisaged the semantic (and ideological) undecidability in the Mexican
Revolution as a condition for the instauration of an authoritarian regime whose
early development he fictionalised through the bloodstained return of the Aztec
gods. He proved to be a very keen prophet. The political and legal development of
Mexico along the twentieth century is closely connected to the historical undecid-
ability of the term ‘revolution’. In 1929, Plutarco Elías Calles–whose term as
president had just finished a few months before–fostered among the surviving
caudillos the foundation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolu-
tionary Party) (PNR), which is known today as Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(Institutional Revolutionary Party) (PRI). Calles explicitly instructed the drafting
committee of the PNR’s foundational documents–headed by Basilio Vadillo and
José Manuel Puig Casauranc–to summarise and amalgamate fascism, communism
and the ideologies that informed the main American, English and French political
parties in the program and bylaws of the new organisation.149 Calles strategically
sought to preserve the conceptual indeterminacy of the Mexican Revolution in the
institutional charter of the PNR in order to achieve two goals: first, to discipline and
unify the remaining caudillos without threatening their personal political interests by
146Rabasa (1888 [1887]), p 238.
147Ruiz (1984).
148Cabrera (1994 [1911]), pp 45–65.
149Segovia and Lajous (1978), pp 51–54. The drafts of both documents have been reprinted in
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (1981), pp 56–86.

































an ideological definition; and second, to impose a hybrid, pragmatic and adaptable
governance pattern over the social chaos produced by the revolution.
On this historical basis, Giovanni Sartori characterised Mexico under the PNR/
PMR/PRI150 as a case of a pragmatic-hegemonic party–that is, a one-party political
regime in which minor parties exist but do not matter, and the major party keeps its
dominant position through its capacity to be more practical and operative than
ideological.151 The key pieces of this political system were basically two: the PRI and
the President, who took over the leadership role of the caudillos. One party ruled
everything and one man ruled that party by constantly defining and redefining the
meaning of the Mexican Revolution and, consequently, the structure of the political
and legal institutions whose legitimacy allegedly depended on their revolutionary
origins and grounds. Calles, for example, was relatively radical in its initial stance
towards the Church and the oil companies, but became more moderate, even
conservative, with time. Calles’ successor, Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, was intensely
radical between 1936 and 1937, but shifted to the centre after 1938, seeking detente
with the Church, the private sector and the United States. In each of these cases,
contingent factors affected the ideological colouring of the ‘official’ readings of the
Mexican Revolution.
The PRI monopolised not only the government, but also the interpretation of the
Constitution during 71 years. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 was considered the
main channel for the legal performance of the Mexican Revolution.152 Accordingly,
the Constitution was not conceived in functional terms, but rather as a substantive
expression of the revolutionary ‘ideals’. These ‘ideals’ remain undefined even today,
so the Constitution was repeatedly amended according to the political preferences
and strategic needs of the President. The contradictions between these reforms were
forestalled by the argument that they were only expressing the adaptation of the
supposedly unchanging revolutionary ‘ideals’ to the new times.153 In this way, from
1929 until 2000 (the year the PRI’s presidential candidate was defeated for the first
time in history by the candidate of the conservative Partido Acción Nacional
[National Action Party]), the Constitution was amended 142 times as the Mexican
Revolution was successively defined as socialist, nationalist, liberal or social-liberal
(whatever that means), among many other characterisations.154
Such is the political tragedy of Mexico that Lawrence foresaw with anguish and
anger. In the short story titled ‘The Mozo’, Lawrence chastises the ‘Aztec gods
and goddesses’ for breeding myths that are deprived of ‘grace’, ‘charm’ or ‘poetry’.
150The party that was founded by Calles has changed its name three times: between 1938 and
1946, it was called Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (Party of the Mexican Revolu-
tion) (PRM).
151Sartori (1976), pp 232–234.
152Cossío (2001), p 101.
153Cossío (2001), p 102.
154From 1917 until 2013, the Constitution has been amended 206 times. An updated list of
amendments can be consulted online at Cámara de Diputados, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/
LeyesBiblio/ref/cpeum, 23 March 2013.

































The petty gift that these deities offered to Mexico and its people was only ‘perpetual
grudge, grudge, grudging, one god grudging another, the gods grudging men their
existence, and men grudging the animals’.155 He was right. Resentment and pain
were the only legacy of the caudillos. The revolutionary bloodshed advanced no
salvation at all: it was useless in the end. There was no ultimate rupture between the
Díaz’ dictatorship and the PNR/PRM/PRI regime, but an appalling continuity in
the affirmation of the state’s authority as a conceptually amorphous articulator of
identity, economic development and social justice.156
A Mandersonian reading of The Plumed Serpent hence reveals–quite paradox-
ically–the limits of Manderson’s literary jurisprudence. ‘Thirroul of Law’ could not
have outlasted the Mexican post-revolutionary atmosphere of untrammelled and
normalised violence combined with absolute legal uncertainty. The endorsement of
undecidability and ‘trial and error’ as legal methodologies has very different
consequences in different contexts. Kangaroo’s desire for transcendence is different
from Cipriano/Huitzilopochtli’s pragmatic lust for power. When Manderson writes
that ‘there is nothing so beautiful […] as a judge who changes his mind and says
so’157, I believe he does not have in mind judges–or, as a matter of fact, any other
public officials–that, for example, publicly redefine the term ‘democracy’ in order to
prosecute those who make public expression of their religious creed, as happened in
Mexico shortly after Lawrence visited the country.158 In this case, the ‘error’ would
totally subvert the ‘trial’: an authentic Mexican commonplace that fascinated and
terrified Lawrence.
Discursive transparency is not enough to lay the foundations of the rule of law
anytime and everywhere. Whereas Manderson, on the one hand, rightly points out
that the contemporary critical discourses that have challenged the positivist model of
the rule of law–for example, deconstructionism, feminism and post-colonialism–have
evidenced that the recognition of a ‘hard core of [legal] settled meaning’159 is nothing
but a fiction and a (legal) fetish; The Plumed Serpent, on the other hand, illustrates
how the idea of such hard core of objective meaning in the legal field is still a
necessary fiction and a convenient (legal) fetish in case you are forced to face in a
reptilian court the pretensions of limitless and divine sovereignty of the ancient
Aztec gods.
The contingency and polarity of the rule of law cannot and should not be applied
universally. ‘Thirroul of Law’ confidently presumes a basis of stable legality and a
civil society where political civility and social commitment are taken for granted.
Nonetheless, whenever these conditions are absent positivism is not a nightmare but
a dignified dream of legal deliverance that provides individuals a minimum level of
155Lawrence (2010 [1927]), pp 55–56.
156Córdova (2011 [1973]).
157Manderson (2012a), p 171.
158In 1926, President Calles reformed the criminal code in order to criminalise the public
expression of the Catholic religious rituals.
159Hart (1958), p 614.

































certainty in face of the arbitrariness of untrammelled powers. Let us remember, for
example, that positivism played a major role in undermining the legal and
jurisprudential discourses that structured the dictatorship of Francisco Franco in
Spain160 or the Junta regime in Argentina.161
By considering a single crisis of modernity through a single work in Lawrence’s
canon, Manderson narrowed the scope of his call to rethink the rule of law to the
singularity of the Australian postcolonial modernity where the positivist rule of law
and the liberal public sphere were, since the time in which Lawrence wrote
Kangaroo, ongoing–though imperfect–realities. We can conclude then that legal
positivism can still be defined as an unfinished historical project–to borrow Jürgen
Habermas’ famous phrase162–depending on contexts that are determined altogether
through social institutions and systems, social agents, and art and symbolic forms in
general.
Epilogue: the crises of modernities
Context is everything in critical legal theory. We must always keep in mind that a
positivist rule of law constitutes a sine qua non condition for the theoretical
construction of the post-positivist rule of law that Manderson pursues. The theses
advanced by Manderson in the field of law and literature are nevertheless a very
valuable contribution to the urgent task of rethinking the rule of law. Manderson has
worthily reconfigured this field by acknowledging the complexity of the relationship
between literary and cultural traditions and legal discourses. Narrative fictions are
neither transparent representations of the world nor palatable suppliers of moral
values. Both Manderson and D.H. Lawrence have opened the theoretical paths to
constitute distinct narratives, aesthetic traditions, and mythologies in effective
resources through which to engage in political action and legal critique. Perhaps
Mexicans–as well as citizens from many other ‘transitional’ societies–may not
benefit even nowadays from Manderson’s exquisitely democratic post-positivist
‘Thirroul of Law’, but they may sensitively look into the aforementioned narratives,
traditions and myths to find their own way towards improved forms of democratic
participation and public commitment.
The contrast between the Australian and Mexican jurisprudential models that
Lawrence developed through the practice of literature simply points to the
introduction of a slight hue in Manderson’s theory: modernity is not unique, and
its crises are plural. In this sense, modernities entail several competing master
narratives and cultural contextualisations that result in multiple legal crises. These
varieties of narratives, contexts and crises do not simply coexist and challenge each
other: they are actually entangled in various ways.163 Kangaroo and The Plumed
Serpent ultimately spell out not only the finitude of the horizons that frame our
understanding of the world and ourselves, but also the potential connectivity
160Díaz (1975).
161Alchuorrón and Bulygin (1975).
162Habermas (1981).
163See Therborn (2003).

































between different modernities and their contextual forms of discourse, movements,
conflicts and institutions.
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